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ABSTRACT  
In this paper we quantitatively analyze which factors led 
to the success of the razzia that took place in Rotterdam 
in 1944. We show that the factors which made people less 
likely to evade capture were the use of surprise and the 
creation of a feeling of fear. Factors which made people 
less likely to evade and also less likely to escape after 
being captured were the use of misinformation and the 
creation of a feeling of powerlessness. We also found 
that, counter to expectations, a person’s demographic 
background did not impact the success of this razzia. 
Keywords 
Razzia, Rotterdam 1944, success factors, wartime 
strategy, quantitative analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we focus on the razzia that took place in 
Rotterdam on the 10th and 11th of November, 1944. It was 
the largest razzia in the Netherlands during the Second 
World War as 8,000 soldiers captured and transported 
more than 50,000 of the 70,000 men between 17 and 40 
who were present in Rotterdam and Schiedam during the 
two day period. The Germans then shipped 10,000 of 
these men to labor camps in the Eastern part of the 
Netherlands and 40,000 to labor camps in Germany [3]. 
Soon after the war scholars wondered how such a large 
percentage of men could have been taken in such a short 
period of time. One can state that the Germans were very 
successful since a relatively small number of German 
soldiers were able to gather and remove 50,000 of the 
70,000 men from Rotterdam and Schiedam. In 1951 Sijes 
[3] qualitatively researched which factors led to this 
success. To do so, he performed a large-scale survey 
among the men who had been captured, asking them 
about their background information and experiences 
during the razzia. In this paper we use this survey to build 
upon his work by quantitatively analyzing which factors 
led to this razzia’s success. 
 
Our central question is ‘Which factors caused the 
Germans to be so successful?’. In contrast to Sijes [3] 
who posed this same question and answered it using 
qualitative methods, we will use quantitative methods for 
our analysis of the survey data from the 1944 razzia. This 
makes it possible to quantitatively test Sijes’ work. In this 
paper, ‘successfulness’ is defined as the inverse of 
evasion and the inverse of escape. In other words, a factor 
which made people less likely to evade and/or escape, 
would be a factor which made the razzia more successful. 
‘Evasion’ means preventing oneself from being captured, 
e.g. by fleeing or hiding, and ‘escape’ means getting 
away from the Germans after being captured. Thus if a 
factor prevents a person from evading, this factor would 
have a short-term effect. If a factor also prevents a person 
from escaping, it would not only have a short-term, but 
also a long-term effect.  
Two types of ‘success factors’ can be distinguished. On 
the one hand, we look at factors related to the 
circumstances created by and choices made by the 
Germans, namely the use of surprise, the use of 
misinformation, the creation of a feeling of 
powerlessness, the creation of a feeling of fear and the 
day a person was arrested. On the other hand, we look at 
factors related to a person’s demographic information, 
specifically a person’s marital status, religious affiliation 
and occupation. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGIES 
To allow for a statistical analysis, Lotte Mulders digitized 
1,115 free-form questionnaires. The original 
questionnaires contained 42 questions of which the most 
relevant were selected to keep the digitization process 
focused and timely. We then wrote a program which 
automatically converted these digitized responses into a 
single file which contained all the digitized information 
of the 1115 respondents. This data consisted of the 
answers of the respondents stored in twelve variables. 
Examples of these variables are ‘marital status’ and 
‘evasion’.  
To analyze this data, Chi-Square and Cramér’s V tests 
were used to first find relations between different 
variables. Binary logistic regression and multinomial 
logistic regression were used to calculate the relative 
impact of one or more variables on a dependent variable 
[1] [2].  
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 RESULTS 
Surprise and misinformation 
The relation between the variable ‘information at hand’ 
and the variable ‘evasion’ is set out in Figure 1. This 
figure shows that 16% of the people who mentioned that 
they were ‘unaware/surprised’ tried to evade while 43% 
of the people who were ‘aware’ tried to evade. The 
Cramér’s V value for these two variables is 0.26 (95%CI 
[0.20, 0.32]), showing that there are significant 
differences in evasion between the different ‘information 
at hand’ categories. To examine whether the differences 
between being ‘unaware/surprised’ and being ‘aware’ are 
also statistically significant, binary logistic regression 
was used, which showed that being ‘unaware/surprised’ 
made a person 3.9 (95%CI [2.6, 5.9]) times less likely to 
evade compared to people who were ‘aware’. 
 
Figure 1: The relation between the variables information at hand 
and evasion. 
To examine the effect of being surprised on whether 
people tried to escape, Figure 2 was created. This figure 
shows that there is a small difference of 8% between, on 
the one hand, being ‘unaware/surprised’ and escaping 
and, on the other hand, between being ‘aware’ and 
escaping. The Cramér’s V value is 0.08 (95%CI [0.03, 
0.15]), which furthermore confirmed little differences 
between the categories. Using binary logistic regression, 
no statically significant effect was found between being 
‘unaware/surprised’ and being ‘aware’ on whether a 
person tried to escape. 
 
Figure 2: The relation between the variables information at hand 
and escape. 
Misinformed, powerlessness and fear 
In this section the relation between the variables 
‘motives’ and ‘evasion’/‘escape’ is set out. The variable 
‘motives’ contains the answers of the respondents to the 
question ‘Which motives caused you to evade or not to 
evade?’. Figure 3 shows that people with the motive 
‘misinformed’ were least likely to evade and people with 
the motive ‘anti-German’ were most likely to evade. 
 Logistic regression showed that people with the motives 
‘powerlessness’ and ‘fear’ were less likely to evade 
compared to people with the motive ‘misinformed’ but 
more likely to evade compared to people with the motives 
‘other’ and ‘anti-German’.  
 
Figure 3: The relation between the variables motives and 
evasion. 
The relation between the motives and whether a person 
tried to escape can be seen in Figure 4. Here we see that 
that people with the motive ‘misinformed’ are least likely 
to escape while people with the motive ‘anti-German’ are 
most likely to escape. Binary logistic regression shows 
that people with the motives ‘misinformed’ and 
‘powerlessness’ are less likely to escape compared to 
people with the motives ‘fear’, ‘other’ and ‘anti-German’.  
 Figure 4: The relation between the variables motives and 
escape. 
Day of arrest 
We found no significant correlation between the day a 
person was arrested and whether a person tried to evade 
or escape. We did, however, find a relation between the 
day a person was arrested and what that person gave as 
the reason for the German success.  This relation is set 
out in Figure 5 and the Cramér’s V value for this relation 
is 0.16 (95%CI [0.11, 0.24]), which means there is a 
small correlation between these variables.  
Two differences stand out within this figure, namely that 
38% of the people who were arrested on the first day 
named ‘surprise’ as reason for the German success while 
only 25% of the people arrested on the second day named 
‘surprise’. Furthermore, 32% of the people arrested on the 
first day named ‘fear’ as the reason for the German 
success while 47% of the people who were arrested on 
the second day named ‘fear’ as reason for the German 
success.  Thus, more people named ‘surprise’ on the first 
day compared to the second day and more people named 
‘fear’ on the second day compared to the first day.  
Multinomial logistic regression showed that these 
differences were significant and that people who were 
arrested on the first day compared to people who were 
arrested on the second day, are 2.1 (95%CI [1.5, 3.0]) 
times more likely to name ‘surprise’ as reason for the 
German success than to name ‘fear’. People who were 
arrested on the second day compared to people who were 
arrested on the first day, are 2.1 (95%CI [1.5, 2.9]) times 
more likely to name ‘fear’ as reason for the German 
success than to name ‘surprise’. 
 
Figure 5: Relation between the variables day of arrest and 
reasons German success. 
A person’s demographic information 
There does not seem to be a significant effect of a 
person’s occupation on whether said person tried to evade 
or escape. This was concluded after ordering the 
occupations both hierarchically (higher and lower 
occupations) and in terms of their connectivity (extent of 
contact with other people). However it could be that 
ordering occupations based on different characteristics 
would yield a correlation between, on the one hand, 
occupations and, on the other hand, evasion or escape.  
There is no effect of being religious on whether a person 
tried to evade or escape. Neither does a person’s marital 
status seem to have an effect on whether that person tried 
to evade or escape. As we expected a married person to 
be less likely to evade, as not to risk their families, and 
more likely to escape to get back to their families, this is a 
remarkable result. This may be the case because we 
looked at all men between 17 and 40 years old. For 
instance, 17-year-olds would likely not be married, but 
they would still have wanted to get back to their families. 
So perhaps comparing ‘marital status’, and the other 
variables which pertain to a person’s demographic 
information, within certain age groups would yield more 
information about the relation between said variable and 
whether one would try to evade or escape. At this time, 
however, it is not possible to test this hypothesis as the 
ages of the respondents were not digitized. 
 CONCLUSION 
The data suggests that the circumstances created by the 
Germans, namely the use of surprise, the use of 
misinformation, the creation of a feeling of powerlessness 
and the creation of a feeling of fear, caused people not to 
try to evade and were therefore short-term success 
factors. The use or misinformation and the creation of a 
feeling of powerlessness also made people less likely to 
try to escape after being captured, making these factors 
long-term success factors. A person’s background 
characteristics, specifically his marital status, religious 
affiliation and occupation, had no statistically significant 
effect on whether a person would try to evade or escape. 
This is summarized in Table 1. 
 Evasion Escape 
Use of surprise Negative impact None 
Use of 
misinformation 
Negative impact Negative impact 
Creation of a 
feeling of 
powerlessness 
Negative impact Negative impact 
Creation of a 
feeling of fear 
Negative impact None 
Marital status None None 
Religious 
affiliation 
None None 
Occupational 
hierarchy 
None None 
Occupational 
connectivity 
None None 
Table 1: Summary of the results. 
Surprise is often named as the reason for the success of 
the Germans on 10th and 11th of November in 1944 [3] 
[4]. My work has shown that, indeed, the short-term 
effect of being surprised or unaware is strong as it made 
people less likely to try to evade. There is, however, no 
long-term effect of being surprised. In comparison, the 
use of misinformation had both a short-term and long-
term effect, making the use of misinformation a stronger 
reason for the success of the Germans when compared to 
the use of surprise. 
We were able to confirm Sijes’ work [3] with regard to 
the motives ‘misinformed’, ‘powerlessness’ and ‘fear’, as 
we showed that being misinformed, feeling powerless and 
feeling fearful were reasons why people did not evade. 
Additionally, this quantitative analysis was able to show 
that the negative effect of misinformation on whether a 
person evades was stronger than the effect of 
powerlessness and fear. 
Regarding the day of arrest, Sijes [3] stated that the 
Germans knew that they had lost the element of surprise 
after the first day and that they tried to compensate for 
this lack of surprise by increasing their intimidation 
tactics on the second day. This analysis has shown that 
this could be true as people on the second day were less 
surprised and more fearful. What this analysis has added 
to Sijes’ statement, is that it provides evidence that this 
German tactic worked since people were not more likely 
to try to evade on the second day compared to the first 
day, even if they were not as surprised. 
Sijes [3] had qualitatively analyzed the 1944 razzia in 
Rotterdam and in this thesis we have built on his work by 
quantitatively analyzing the survey of this razzia. By 
doing so we were not only able to confirm and question 
some of Sijes’ findings but we were also able to show 
what the relative impact of different success factors were 
and if these success factors had a short-term or a long-
term effect. 
On a side note, the goal of the Germans was twofold, on 
the one hand, recruiting more labor for Germany and, on 
the other hand, removing men from threatened areas to 
prevent these men from joining forces with the Allies. 
Even short-term success factors such as the use of 
surprise and the creation of a feeling of fear would be 
enough to accomplish the removal of able-bodied men 
from the advancing western front. 
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